A growing literature has begun to investigate how employee job satisfaction adapts to events. These studies have looked at how both work-related and non-work-related events impact job satisfaction. For example, with regard to non-work-related events, job satisfaction has been shown to respond differently over time to life events such as marriage and having a first child ([@b30]). Personality, disposition, and work--life conflict are non-work-related factors shown to affect job satisfaction ([@b20]; [@b22]; [@b23]).

In contrast, studies exploring how job satisfaction responds to work-related events over time have focused mainly on job changes and workplace reorganization ([@b6]; [@b13]; [@b31]; [@b48]; [@b52]). Other studies focusing on work-related factors have analyzed earnings, working hours, working environment, workplace socialization, autonomy, organizational control, and participation in training schemes with respect to job satisfaction ([@b2]; [@b3]; [@b28]).

These studies have carried out direct, causal examinations, but they do not explicitly investigate how job satisfaction adapts to external shocks. While some research has investigated the impact of external shocks, such as disability on well-being, these studies have exclusively focused on life domain and life satisfaction ([@b49]). Although the impact of individual factors on job satisfaction is well known ([@b19]; [@b24]; [@b44]; [@b50]; [@b51]), evidence on the direct, dynamic impact of organizational external events on workers' job satisfaction is virtually nonexistent, especially for the public sector.

A fundamental determinant of employee job satisfaction is the fit between the employee and his or her organization. Compatibility of employees' values and beliefs with those of the organization can result in increased job satisfaction ([@b41]; [@b47]). Theories related to person--organization (PO) fit cover a wide spectrum of approaches, including selection and socialization with PO fit ([@b12]), mediation of the relationship between works attitudes and motivation ([@b41]), work values and job choice decisions ([@b39]), conceptualization and operationalization of PO fit ([@b42]), and the fit of employee identity and organizational values ([@b38]). However, these studies largely rely on data that are contemporaneous in nature instead of direct and causal examinations over time ([@b42]). "A fundamental determinant of employee job satisfaction is the fit between the employee and his or her organization."

We advance theory on PO fit and approaches to job satisfaction in the public sector by answering two questions: (1) How does job satisfaction in the public sector adapt to external random shocks? And (2) how does political preference, a form of PO fit, affect job satisfaction in the public sector? Whereas the second question can be considered reasonably standard but still worthwhile of being investigated, the first one, focusing on adaptation, brings a considerably new and interesting element to the study of PO fit. Studying adaptation patterns generates insights on how individuals cope with (un)expected events and how this translates into their professional lives.

According to [@b18], empirical research can make theoretical contributions through testing and building theory. This article emphasizes theory testing by exploiting a longitudinal data set for the analysis of PO fit in the public sector, with predictions grounded in PO fit theory. Additionally, we contribute to the adaptation literature and extend it to the public sector. The study of unexplored processes ranks high on the theoretical contribution taxonomy ([@b18]). Therefore, in this article, we aim to cover the following points

First, we consider the results of political elections to be an external shock to the public sector. We use the results of political elections in a quasi-natural experiment to examine the adaptation of job satisfaction in the public sector. This leads to better understanding of how the job satisfaction and well-being of public sector workers responds to external events. This is especially important because job satisfaction is related to observable workplace behaviors, including absenteeism, organizational commitment, productivity, and quits ([@b16]; [@b40]; [@b55]; [@b56]).

Second, we focus on the matching of employee political preference to the political type of the governing senior elected officials and its impact on job satisfaction of public sector employees. Ultimately the public sector is led by elected politicians whose decisions and actions are influenced by their political affiliation. We argue that such politically driven behavior simultaneously determines whether the culture, climate, and values of public sector organizations are congruent with employee values. ([@b21]). "Preference matching" occurs when an individual\'s preferred political party governs at the national level. Such value congruence may ultimately lead to increased job satisfaction ([@b41]; [@b47]).

The results further have the potential to challenge standard PO fit theory, which relies on the assumption of value congruence. Values are considered to be relatively stable over time ([@b11], [@b12]), and their fit with the values represented by the organization determines job satisfaction levels. However, if we find evidence for adaptation in the case of matched political preferences---that is, job satisfaction falls to baseline levels although values are aligned---PO fit theory can be criticized.

Our analyses are based on data drawn from the British Household Panel Survey, a large longitudinal data set. The present study extends previous PO fit research by making three major contributions: First, we contribute to the nascent body of research examining the adaptation of job satisfaction to work-related and non-work-related events by investigating adaptation in the public sector. Second, we focus our analysis on adaptation to an external shock. The literature on adaptation largely considers events that are entirely or partly endogenous (e.g., marriage, voluntary job change). It does not investigate adaptation to external events. Thus, this article opens new avenues for research on job satisfaction. Third, the effect of political preferences on job satisfaction is seldom investigated, although it might have a critical impact on the performance of public sector organizations. In addition, we highlight how the effects of political preference matching differ across gender.

Theoretical Development
=======================

The following sections outline approaches to PO fit and its relation to job satisfaction and political preferences as external shocks. We also discuss adaptation issues and gender differences in job satisfaction. Ultimately, each section derives hypotheses.

Person--Organization Fit and Political Preferences
--------------------------------------------------

PO fit considers the compatibility between individuals and organizations. It occurs when "(a) at least one entity provides what the other needs, (b) they share similar fundamental characteristics, or (c) both" ([@b42], 4). PO fit is often understood as value congruence ([@b11]; [@b43]). According to the theory of work adjustment, job satisfaction represents employees' subjective evaluation of the degree to which their requirements are met by the work environment ([@b7]). The theory states that the fit between employees and the organization determines the level of job satisfaction experienced by employees.

Increasingly, the PO fit literature has focused on employee--organization value congruence. Value congruence between employees and organizations refers to the compatibility of the employee\'s values and beliefs with those represented by the organization ([@b54]). Value congruence is particularly important because values are relatively stable over time and guide people\'s attitudes, judgments, and behaviors ([@b11], [@b12]). Individuals' political preferences are deemed to be a good proxy for deeply rooted individual beliefs and values. This is because they capture deeply embedded value systems in any given personality. Many voters think of themselves as long-term party supporters and remain loyal to the same party across different elections ([@b36]).

Organizational values convey information about expectations and formal and informal rules, which connect the individual employee to the broader organizational context ([@b38]). Studies have shown that high-ranking members of organizations, such as top management teams, strongly influence the values and culture of organizations ([@b35]). We argue that governing senior elected officials influence the culture, climate, and values of public sector organizations through their policy and management decisions. Because those decisions and actions are strongly influenced by the elected official\'s political affiliation, the political affiliation of senior elected officials will determine whether the culture, climate, and values of public sector organizations are congruent with employee values.

Having a political party preference match between public sector employees and senior governing elected officials is likely to result in a high level of value congruence between such public sector employees and the organization. This is because senior governing officials will influence the values and culture of the organization to reflect their political values and beliefs. This high degree of value congruence between employees and the organization will imply that matching employees will derive greater job satisfaction from working in the public sector. Consequently, we derive the following hypothesis:"A political party preference match between public sector employees and senior governing elected officials is likely to result in a high level of value congruence between such public sector employees and the organization." "**Hypothesis 1:** Political party preference matching between employees and senior governing elected officials is associated with higher job satisfaction in the public sector."

External Shocks
---------------

The outcomes of political elections are, to a large extent, external to the public sector. The change in senior elected governing officials can have both positive and negative effects on the job satisfaction of public sector workers with matching political preferences. First, as discussed earlier, job satisfaction will likely increase if the political preference of public sector workers matches the political affiliation of the new senior elected governing officials because of value congruence.

Second, internal processes of the organization are likely to change following an external change in public sector political leadership ([@b59]). A change in leadership will result in some reorganization of the public sector. Research shows that job satisfaction decreases immediately before and during reorganization in the workplace. This decrease in job satisfaction is attributed to uncertainty during reorganization and is found in various forms of workplace restructuring, including restructuring of local government, privatization, and intracompany job transfers ([@b48]; [@b52]). Because the public sector goes through significant reorganization when new senior officials govern following an election, we can expect employee job satisfaction to be adversely affected during that reorganization.

The change in senior governing officials will have a positive effect on the job satisfaction of preference-matching public sector employees if the positive effect of political party preference matching is greater than the negative effect of workplace reorganization on job satisfaction. The euphoria and positive emotion associated with a preferred political party winning an election is experienced immediately after the election. Typically, changes in the working of the organization only begin to be implemented several months after the election and continue for several years thereafter. Thus, the negative impact of workplace reorganization on job satisfaction will take place sometime after the election. Therefore, we expect the job satisfaction of preference-matching public employees to increase immediately after an election that elects their preferred political party."**Hypothesis 2:** A change in public sector political leadership will positively impact the job satisfaction of preference-matching public sector employees."

Adaptation and Internal Processes of the Organization
-----------------------------------------------------

Recently, researchers have become interested in analyzing patterns of adaptation to life events ([@b15]; [@b30]; [@b31]). Adaptation is founded on the psychological literature on set point theory, which argues that individuals have happiness set points to which they inevitably return following disruptive life events ([@b32]). A number of studies have used large-scale longitudinal data to look for evidence of adaptation to economic and life events ([@b10]; [@b15]; [@b27]). For example, [@b15] found evidence of complete adaptation of life satisfaction to marriage, childbirth, widowhood, and divorce. However, they found no evidence of adaptation to unemployment. With respect to job satisfaction, [@b30] found evidence that job satisfaction does not adapt to the birth of a first child for women. [@b31] found evidence that the increase in job satisfaction after a job change from the private sector to the public sector does not dissipate. The events that this literature has focused on are largely endogenous or partially endogenous events. Very few studies have looked at adaptation to external events. One exception is the study by [@b49], which found evidence of incomplete adaptation to disability, a largely external event. In this article, we contribute to the study of adaptation to external events by investigating the impact of election results, which are largely external, on the job satisfaction of public sector workers.

Adaptation theory implies that preference matching will only have a positive impact on job satisfaction for a limited period of time, as job satisfaction will eventually adapt back to a baseline level. The emotional response to an event is a main feature of adaptation processes. Events whose outcomes are below expectations or whose impact takes place over a short time period will result in emotional responses of shorter duration. In contrast, events whose impact is continuous and sustained will result in emotional responses over a longer duration. Therefore, the outcome of events experienced by the organization will significantly determine the length of time it takes for well-being in the workplace to return to pre-event levels. This is especially relevant when we consider the context of U.K. politics. The Labor and Conservative parties in the United Kingdom have converged dramatically on economic and social policy over the past two decades in an attempt to win votes ([@b1]). Indeed, the Tony Blair government was accused of being a right-wing government in disguise ([@b1]). As a result, its supporters were likely disappointed and frustrated by the economic and social policies pursued by the new governing party. This would be expected to lead to lower job satisfaction among public sector workers supporting this party. Also, adaptation to baseline occurs relatively quickly after the election."**Hypothesis 3:** Job satisfaction quickly reverts to a baseline level after political party preference matching."

Gender Differences in Job Satisfaction
--------------------------------------

Gender differences in labor market attachment, job satisfaction, work--life conflict, and workplace values are well documented in the literature ([@b14]; [@b34]; [@b57]). A large body of empirical evidence has shown that women hold greater responsibility in household work and raising children than their male counterparts ([@b61]). However, [@b14] argues that gender differences in job satisfaction should be transitory.

In addition, the analysis of gender and political preferences has provided interesting insights on the differences between men and women in political issue identification and prioritization. For example, women are more likely to prioritize education and health care issues, and men are more likely to select the economy as their most important election issue ([@b9]). Furthermore, men are found to be more committed and attached to political parties ([@b53]). Such gender differences are likely to be an important moderating factor in the influence of external change on job satisfaction, as women may find it more difficult to adjust to changes brought about by new political leadership. Because there are important gender differences in political issue identification and commitment, gender may moderate the impact of external change on job satisfaction in the public sector. Therefore, we hypothesize,"The analysis of gender and political preferences has provided interesting insights on the differences between men and women in political issue identification and prioritization." "**Hypothesis 4:** Women\'s job satisfaction is more likely to be adversely affected by external change in the public sector than men\'s job satisfaction."

Data and Methodology
====================

Sample
------

The data set comprises the first 18 waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS is an annual survey consisting of a nationally representative sample of about 5,500 households recruited in 1991, containing approximately 10,000 individuals. The sample is a stratified clustered design drawn from the Postcode Address File. All residents present at those addresses at the first wave of the survey were reinterviewed each successive year, and they were followed thereafter, even if they moved to a new household. The BHPS is an unbalanced panel in that although approximately 10,000 individuals are interviewed year to year, some individuals drop out from the sample. Because of attrition, men remain in the survey for an average of 4.9 years, while women remain in the sample for 4.7 years from 1991 to 2008 in our final sample.

The longitudinal nature of the BHPS allows us to identify public sector workers before and after political elections, thus providing a quasi-natural experiment, as the results of political elections are largely external to the public sector. In addition, the BHPS provides a rich source of information on demographic and labor market characteristics, as well as information on individuals' subjective evaluation of their jobs, their economic situation, and their political preferences.^[1](#fn1){ref-type="fn"}^

In our sample, we have 1,667 men whom we observe 8,159 times from 1991 to 2008 and 2,519 women whom we observe 11,893 times from 1991 to 2008. Thus, our final sample consists of 8,159 and 11,893 person-year observations for men and women, respectively. The sample consists of full-time workers in the public sector ages 16 to 65. Our sample does not include any part-time or unemployed individuals.

Identification of Political Preferences
---------------------------------------

Using exclusive categories, respondents are required to identify which political party they are closest to: Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats (Liberals/Social Democratic Party \[SDP\]), Scottish Nationalists, Plaid Cymru, Green Party, or other parties. Political party preference is identified after the respondent answer yes to either of the following questions: "Generally speaking do you think of yourself as a supporter of any one political party?" or "Do you think of yourself as a little closer to one political party than to the others?" Because of the small number of observations, the Liberal Democrats (Liberals/SDP), Scottish Nationalists, Plaid Cymru, and Green Party were reclassified as other parties. This question was asked in every year in which the panel data were collected. Table [1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"} shows the distribution of political party preference among public sector workers.

###### 

Political Party Preferences of Public Sector Workers

  Year    Men     Women                            
  ------- ------- ------- ------- -------- ------- -------
  1991      484     180     125     512      159     130
  1992      163      47      33     276       54      51
  1993      422     176      84     490      180      95
  1994      408     184      73     491      186      67
  1995      386     187      68     489      195      71
  1996      387     180      81     509      187      77
  1997      358     176      53     512      242      64
  1998      384     173      52     553      216      80
  1999      574     213      67     835      302      88
  2000      560     204      77     834      294      92
  2001      579     214      69     875      326      91
  2002      515     170      63     773      272      66
  2003      495     155      63     782      225      69
  2004      494     154      69     793      228      77
  2005      505     164      59     827      254      80
  2006      500     152      73     811      227      79
  2007      486     142      68     788      230      75
  2008      459     138      69     743      176      81
  Total   8,159   3,009   1,246   11,893   3,953   1,433

Matched Political Preferences
-----------------------------

Matched political preferences occur when, at a given point in time, a public sector employee\'s preferred political party is governing at the national level. In our sample, the Conservative Party was in power from 1991 to 1996, and the Labour Party was in power from 1997 to 2008.^[2](#fn2){ref-type="fn"}^ Four interaction terms are created to identify when political preferences matched and mismatched the governing political party.

Dependent Variable
------------------

The dependent variable is overall job satisfaction. Overall job satisfaction is measured on an ordinal Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7, where a value of 1 corresponds to "not satisfied at all" and a value of 7 corresponds to "completely satisfied." The measure is constructed from individuals' responses to the question, "I am going to read out a list of various aspects of jobs, and after each one I\'d like you to tell me from this card (19) which number best describes how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with that particular aspect of your present job."^[3](#fn3){ref-type="fn"}^ Various studies show that a single-item overall job satisfaction measure performs well as opposed to multiple item and domain measures of job satisfaction ([@b29]; [@b60]).

Control Variables
-----------------

We use a common set of control variables to minimize the impact of biasing effects. We control for demographic and job characteristics. The demographic characteristics that we control for are age, marital status, education, region, and health. In order to identify a nonlinear relationship between age and job satisfaction, we also include the square of individuals' age as a control variable. The job characteristics that we control for are the log of individuals' real income (gross monthly income), log of weekly working hours, union membership, promotion opportunities, and occupational classification at the one-digit level. Firm-level controls include job tenure (in years), firm size, and industry classification at the one-digit level.^[4](#fn4){ref-type="fn"}^

Model and Estimation
--------------------

First, we compare the differences in means of job satisfaction in cases of matching and nonmatching political preferences. Second, we estimate the impact of these two cases on job satisfaction using fixed-effect panel regression. Controlling for a fixed effect ensures that the preference matching/mismatch dummy variables pick up the effect of political party preference matching/mismatching instead of selection effects, whereby fixed unobserved individual characteristics (e.g., personality or ability) are associated with higher job satisfaction and a higher probability of having a given political party preference. We present fixed-effects estimations that are based on simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of job satisfaction. [@b25] show that controlling for fixed effects is more important than respecting the ordinality of the variables. They also show that OLS produces coefficients that are easier to interpret in terms of orders of magnitude. Furthermore, the dynamics of adaptation to political preference matching are likely to be moderated by personality traits and individuals' previous experiences. This highlights the importance of accounting for heterogeneity when investigating patterns of adaptation to events ([@b45]).

We control for various demographic and job characteristics, including marital status, education, age, log of real income (gross monthly income), log of weekly working hours, union membership, promotion prospects, job tenure, firm size, health, occupational dummies, industry dummies, and regional dummies.^[5](#fn5){ref-type="fn"}^ Table [2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"} presents the correlations for the control variables. We estimate separate regressions for men and women.

###### 

Correlation Coefficients for Control Variables

                            Mean                                        SD                                          Age                                         Age Squared                                 Health                                      Education: High                             Education: Mid                              Married                                     Widowed                                     Divorced                                    Separated                                  Renter                                      Real Wage
  ------------------------- ------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------
  Age                       40.117                                      10.759                                      1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  Age Squared               1.725                                       0.874                                       0.988[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  Health                    0.513                                       0.500                                       0.160[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.162[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  Education: High           0.644                                       0.479                                       0.033[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.010[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.005                                       1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
  Education: Mid            0.268                                       0.443                                       −0.169[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.155[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.031[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.700[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  Married                   0.575                                       0.494                                       0.443[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.407[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.039[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.039[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.084[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  Widowed                   0.014                                       0.118                                       0.106[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.113[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.026[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.021[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.012[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.100[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.000                                                                                                                                                                          
  Divorced                  0.069                                       0.253                                       0.151[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.143[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.035[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.003                                       −0.019[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.247[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.022[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.000                                                                                                                              
  Separated                 0.017                                       0.128                                       0.029[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.021[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.010[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.009[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.004                                       −0.137[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.012[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.030[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.000                                                                                  
  Renter                    0.147                                       0.354                                       −0.162[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.147[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.010[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.084[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.007^[\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}^    −0.222[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.002                                       0.044[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.039[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.000                                       
  Real Wage                 2.778                                       0.480                                       0.250[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.200[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.024[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.373[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.204[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.212[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.025[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.003                                      0.002                                      −0.208[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.000
  Log Working Hours         3.595                                       0.147                                       −0.015[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.015[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.040[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.006                                      −0.019[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.007                                       −0.029[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.022[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.003                                     0.036[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.220[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}
  Union Member              0.645                                       0.479                                       0.160[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.144[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.038[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.090[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.060[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.098[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.025[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.032[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.003                                     −0.096[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.152[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}
  Promotion Opportunities   0.582                                       0.493                                       −0.165[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.169[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.038[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.123[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.030[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.071[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.018[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.024[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.005                                     −0.002                                      0.130[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}
  Job Tenure                5.409                                       6.44                                        0.027[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.027[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.003                                       −0.002                                      −0.002                                      0.012[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.002                                       0.005                                       −0.001                                     −0.007                                      0.008^[\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}^
  Firm Size: Small          0.195                                       0.397                                       −0.046[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.035[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.001                                      −0.066[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.048[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.045[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.002                                       −0.006                                      −0.003                                     0.077[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.182[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}
  Firm Size: Medium         0.386                                       0.487                                       0.025[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.021[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.000                                      0.011[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.014[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.025[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.003                                      −0.004                                      0.003                                      −0.027[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.029[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                        Log Working Hours                           Union Member                                Promotion Opportunities                     Job Tenure                                  Firm Size: Small                            Firm Size: Medium                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  Log Working Hours         1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  Union Member              −0.098[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
  Promotion Opportunities   −0.023[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.178[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  Job Tenure                −0.001                                      0.001                                       −0.015[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
  Firm Size: Small          0.050[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.173[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.143[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.003                                       1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  Firm Size: Medium         −0.002                                      0.025[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.001                                       −0.003                                      −0.498[\*\*](#tf2-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.000                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

Note: Correlation coefficients for the regional, industry, and occupational dummy variables are not included.

Indicates significance at a 1% confidence level

indicates significance at a 5% confidence level.

Third, the longitudinal nature of the BHPS allows us to identify public sector employees that experience a change in the political leadership and to follow them two years prior to and more than five years after the event. As shown in table A3 in the appendix, we identify 136 men and 150 women who prefer the Labour Party in the year the Labour Party took power from the Conservative Party. These employees experienced a change in public sector political leadership at time *t,* where *t* is the year 1997. To identify adaptation effects to a change in political leadership, we use lag dummies where we identify Labour-preferring employees from the time of the election in each year following the election. The last category is a catchall category for Labour-preferring employees. It captures all employees with a Labour preference starting five years after the election. If all the estimated lag coefficients are approximately the same, then we have no evidence of adaptation. However, if the coefficients of lags distant from the event are smaller than the coefficients of lags close to the time of the event, then this is evidence of adaptation, or at least partial adaptation. The adaptation coefficients should be interpreted according to whether they are significantly different from the baseline (other public sector workers) and not whether the coefficients are significantly different from each other. Table A3 summarizes the number of lag observations in our sample. As table A3 indicates, the number of observations decreases as we move further away from the event. For example, out of the 136 male public sector employees who prefer Labour at the time of the election, we can only follow 130 of them one to two years after the election, 117 of them two to three years after the election, and so on. This is attributable to: (1) sample attrition in the BHPS survey; (2) respondents having stopped indicating their Labour Party preference in the survey; or (3) respondents changing support to another political party.

We estimate fixed-effects regressions to test for adaptation effects from a change of political leadership in the public sector. We use the same methodology used in Georgellis, [@b30] by estimating the lag coefficients in the same regression to ensure that the coefficients are directly comparable. To measure well-being before the election, we look at two lead coefficients, Labour-preferring employees from the time of the election (time *t*) in the two years before the election. We expect the lead coefficients to be insignificant, as public sector workers are unlikely to predict the outcome of an election in the two years before the event. We estimate the following fixed-effects regression equation:

where *S* represents job satisfaction and *X* is a vector of demographic and job characteristics, including marital status, education, number of children, age, income (gross monthly income), firm size, health, regional, and industrial and occupational dummies. *LAB* represents the lead and lag dummy variables, θ is the estimated coefficient for the lead and lag dummy variables, and ε is an error term.

Results
=======

Mean Satisfaction Comparisons
-----------------------------

Table[3](#tbl3){ref-type="table"} summarizes differences in mean job satisfaction between matching and nonmatching of political preference to the governing political party. Unsurprisingly, simple *t*-tests for differences in means reveal that overall job satisfaction is higher in cases in which political preferences match the party in power. Only women preferring the Labour Party deviate from this pattern. These results indicate that political preferences play a role in determining overall job satisfaction.

###### 

Mean Job Satisfaction

                     Men          Women                                                                            
  ------------------ ------------ ------------ ----------------------------------------- ------------ ------------ -----------------------------------------
  Job satisfaction   5.259        5.130        2.52[\*\*](#tf3-1){ref-type="table-fn"}   5.373        5.383        −0.22
  Observations       2,061        948                                                    3,009        944          
                     CN × CNGVT   CN × LBGVT   T-Stat on Difference                      CN × CNGVT   CN × LBGVT   T-Stat on Difference
  Job satisfaction   5.495        5.283        2.89[\*\*](#tf3-1){ref-type="table-fn"}   5.724        5.561        2.58[\*\*](#tf3-1){ref-type="table-fn"}
  Observations       465          781                                                    492          941          

Indicates significance at a 1% confidence level

indicates significance at a 5% confidence level.

Job Satisfaction Regression Results
-----------------------------------

Table[4](#tbl4){ref-type="table"} presents the estimated coefficients of the overall job satisfaction fixed-effects model. The coefficients for men are shown in column 1, while the coefficients for women are shown in column 2. We find that for men, overall job satisfaction is significantly higher when political preferences match the governing party for both Labour-preferring (coeff. *q*~1~= .144, *p* \< .01) and Conservative-preferring (coeff. = .217, *p* \< .01) public sector workers. For women, job satisfaction is higher only when there is a match of Conservative Party preference and Conservative Party government (coeff. *=*. 143, *p* \< .05). We find no impact on job satisfaction when there is a preference mismatch. These results hold after controlling for many demographic and job characteristics.

###### 

Fixed-Effects Results for Impact of Preference Matching on Job Satisfaction

                 Men                                        Women
  -------------- ------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------
  LB × LBGVT     0.144[\*\*](#tf4-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.010
                 (0.048)                                    (0.0389)
  CN × CNGVT     0.217[\*\*](#tf4-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.143[\*](#tf4-3){ref-type="table-fn"}
                 (0.076)                                    (0.072)
  LB × CNGVT     0.121                                      0.070
                 (0.063)                                    (0.056)
  CN × LBGVT     0.032                                      −0.031
                 (0.067)                                    (0.060)
  Observations   8,159                                      11,893
  Individuals    1,667                                      2,519

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.

Indicates significance at a 1% confidence level

indicates significance at a 5% confidence level.

Other controls include age, age squared, number of children, health, education, marital status, renter, log of real wage, log of working hours, union membership, promotion opportunities, job tenure, firm size, and dummy variables for region and occupation.

These results provide evidence for hypothesis 1---that higher levels of value congruence, as proxied by matching political preferences with the current governing senior elected officials, are associated with higher job satisfaction in the public sector. The results also show that there are significant gender differences in the impact of matching political preferences with the current governing senior elected officials."Higher levels of value congruence, as proxied by matching political preferences with the current governing senior elected officials, are associated with higher job satisfaction in the public sector."

Adaptation Results
==================

The results of our trend analysis are given in table[5](#tbl5){ref-type="table"}. We find that for men, job satisfaction increases at the time of a change in political leadership and decreases immediately one year after the event. Job satisfaction and promotion prospects for women decrease in the first two years following a change in political leadership. Wages and working hours are unaffected by the change in leadership.

###### 

Transition to Preference Matching: Trend Analysis

                         Mean Job Satisfaction                       Mean Real Wages (£/month)                     Working Hours (Hrs/Week)                       Promotion Prospects                                                                                                                             
  ---------------------- ------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- ------- ------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------
  Public Sector Mean     5.25                                        5.44                                          2,026                                          1,654                                        38.40                                          35.70   0.62                                        0.56
  *Leads*                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
  1--2 years hence       5.08                                        5.36                                          **1,727**[\*\*](#tf5-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   **1,483**[\*](#tf5-3){ref-type="table-fn"}   37.66                                          36.25   0.65                                        0.58
  Within the next year   5.07                                        5.34                                          **1,726**[\*\*](#tf5-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   **1,479**[\*](#tf5-3){ref-type="table-fn"}   38.26                                          36.12   0.58                                        0.53
  *Lags*                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  0--1 years             5.26                                        **5.21**[\*\*](#tf5-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   **1,774**[\*\*](#tf5-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   1,541                                        38.48                                          36.13   0.60                                        **0.47**[\*](#tf5-3){ref-type="table-fn"}
  1--2 years             **4.97**[\*](#tf5-3){ref-type="table-fn"}   **5.25**[\*](#tf5-3){ref-type="table-fn"}     **1,838**[\*](#tf5-3){ref-type="table-fn"}     1,535                                        38.59                                          36.35   0.59                                        **0.47**[\*](#tf5-3){ref-type="table-fn"}
  2--3 years             5.04                                        5.28                                          1,888                                          1,539                                        38.16                                          36.16   0.59                                        0.50
  3--4 years             5.35                                        5.23                                          1,894                                          1,671                                        38.03                                          35.86   0.58                                        0.49
  4--5 years             5.27                                        5.29                                          1,985                                          1,782                                        38.00                                          35.78   0.65                                        0.56
  5 or more years        5.21                                        5.43                                          2,198[\*\*](#tf5-2){ref-type="table-fn"}       2,341[\*\*](#tf5-2){ref-type="table-fn"}     **37.31**[\*\*](#tf5-2){ref-type="table-fn"}   35.63   **0.57**[\*](#tf5-3){ref-type="table-fn"}   **0.45**[\*\*](#tf5-2){ref-type="table-fn"}

Note: Mean satisfaction scores less than the corresponding mean satisfaction for stayers are in bold.

Indicates significance at a 1% confidence level

indicates significance at a 5% confidence level from public sector mean.

The fixed-effects results of the adaptation to a change in political leadership in the public sector are given in table[6](#tbl6){ref-type="table"}. The first column summarizes the results for men, and the second column summarizes the results for women. We perform separate analyses for men and women because of widely researched differences in terms of workplace values and beliefs, motivation, and labor market attachment. Particularly relevant in the present context is the fact that women tend to hold greater responsibility in household work and child rearing than their male counterparts, and therefore they are more likely to experience the negative effect of changes in the working of the organization.

###### 

Fixed-Effects Job Satisfaction Regressions for Dynamic Impact of Change in Political Leadership

  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Transition to Preference Matching   
  ------------------------- ----------------------------------- -----------------
  *Leads*                                                       

  1--2 years hence          0.006\                              −0.165\
                            (0.100)                             (0.105)

  Within the next year      0.043\                              −0.136\
                            (0.100)                             (0.098)

  *Lags*                                                        

  0--1 years                0.213^\*^\                          −0.214^\*^\
                            (0.103)                             (0.098)

  1--2 years                −0.084\                             −0.239^\*^\
                            (0.106)                             (0.105)

  2--3 years                −0.078\                             −0.275^\*^\
                            (0.112)                             (0.114)

  3--4 years                0.164\                              −0.212\
                            (0.119)                             (0.120)

  4--5 years                0.115\                              −0.129\
                            (0.121)                             (0.126)

  5 or more years           0.052\                              0.063\
                            (0.088)                             (0.082)

  Age                       −0.061^^\*\*^^\                     −0.051^^\*\*^^\
                            (0.019)                             (0.016)

  Age Squared               0.653^^\*\*^^\                      0.171\
                            (0.216)                             (0.182)

  Health                    −0.040\                             −0.053\
                            (0.035)                             (0.029)

  Education: High           −0.018\                             −0.348^^\*\*^^\
                            (0.149)                             (0.125)

  Education: Mid            −0.161\                             −0.310^\*^\
                            (0.157)                             (0.125)

  No. of Children           0.048\                              0.016\
                            (0.025)                             (0.024)

  Married                   −0.143^\*^\                         0.033\
                            (0.065)                             (0.050)

  Widowed                   0.172\                              0.133\
                            (0.221)                             (0.144)

  Divorced                  −0.035\                             −0.038\
                            (0.110)                             (0.083)

  Separated                 0.239\                              0.178\
                            (0.139)                             (0.102)

  Renter                    −0.012\                             −0.008\
                            (0.064)                             (0.052)

  Real wage                 0.284^^\*\*^^\                      −0.013\
                            (0.070)                             (0.056)

  Log Working Hours         −0.309^\*^\                         −0.129\
                            (0.156)                             (0.104)

  Union Member              −0.137^^\*\*^^\                     −0.100^^\*\*^^\
                            (0.040)                             (0.034)

  Promotion Opportunities   0.380^^\*\*^^\                      0.267^^\*\*^^\
                            (0.033)                             (0.026)

  Job Tenure                0.000\                              0.000\
                            (0.000)                             (0.000)

  Firm Size: Small          −0.069\                             −0.025\
                            (0.054)                             (0.045)

  Firm Size: Medium         0.100^\*^\                          0.004\
                            (0.042)                             (0.038)

  Constant                  6.783^^\*\*^^\                      7.623^^\*\*^^\
                            (0.717)                             (0.521)

  Regional Dummies          Yes                                 Yes

  Industry Dummies          Yes                                 Yes

  Occupational Dummies      Yes                                 Yes

  Observations              8,159                               11,893

  Individuals               1,667                               2,519
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Before interpreting the lags and lead coefficients, it is important to consider the estimated coefficients of the control variables. Overall, the results of the control variables, in particular regarding the relation between job satisfaction, age, and education, support the findings of previous studies ([@b17]).

Income is positively associated with job satisfaction for men (β = .284, *p* \< .01). We find no evidence of a positive relationship between income and job satisfaction for women. Working hours are negatively related to job satisfaction for men (β = --.309, *p* \< .05). Unsurprisingly, we also find that the availability of promotion opportunities is positively associated with job satisfaction for both men (β = .380, *p* \< .01) and women (β = .267, *p* \< .01). Union membership is negatively associated with job satisfaction for both men (β = --.137, *p* \< .01) and women (β = --.100, *p* \< .01).

Table[6](#tbl6){ref-type="table"} summarizes the estimated lag and lead coefficients for the effect of a change in political leadership in the public sector. We summarize the estimated lag and lead coefficients from the fixed-effects regressions in figures [1](#fig01){ref-type="fig"}A and [1](#fig01){ref-type="fig"}B. Figure [1](#fig01){ref-type="fig"}A summarizes the results for men, while figure [1](#fig01){ref-type="fig"}B summarizes the results for women. As it emerges from these results, there are no anticipation effects for both men and women to a change in political leadership. This is expected, as it is unlikely public sector employees can predict the outcome of political elections.

![The Dynamic Effect of Preference Matching on Job Satisfaction](puar0074-0384-f1){#fig01}

Discussion
==========

In this study, we use longitudinal data to carry out a quasi-natural experiment to investigate how the job satisfaction of public sector employees adapts to external organizational change. Using recently developed methods underpinned by adaptation theory, we find a statistically significant increase in job satisfaction when political leadership changes to match the preference of male public sector employees. However, job satisfaction for men fully adapts to baseline levels after one year of preference matching. We also find that the job satisfaction of women is less prone to political influence than men. For women, the negative effect on job satisfaction of preference matching lasts for up to three years after a change in political leadership. We attribute this to the adverse effects of organizational change on job satisfaction, as women are less influenced by political preferences.

First, this suggests that, for men, the positive impact of preference matching is greater than the impact of workplace reorganization on job satisfaction soon after the election. Second, this increase is not sustained, and job satisfaction permanently decreases, becoming statistically insignificant one to two years after the event onward. This is strong evidence of adaptation and shows that the positive effect of an external political shock on job satisfaction is temporary.

Instead, for women, there is a statistically significant decrease in job satisfaction when the political leadership changes to match the preference of female public sector employees. Earlier results show that the job satisfaction of women that prefer the Labour Party is unaffected by political party preference matching. This suggests that the decrease in job satisfaction for women is caused by the negative effect of workplace reorganization on job satisfaction. Furthermore, job satisfaction is significantly lower for at least two to three years after the event. This is evidence that there is complete adaptation to a change in political leadership in the public sector only after two to three years. This longer adjustment period reflects the uncertainty and changes from new policies that are likely to affect work--life balance issues that are important to women and have been shown to adversely affect women\'s job satisfaction ([@b30])."There is complete adaptation to a change in political leadership in the public sector only after two to three years."

The present study makes the following contributions to adaptation and PO fit research. First, we contribute to the nascent body of research examining the adaptation of job satisfaction to work-related and non-work-related events. We study adaptation to organizational change that is the result of an event external to the organization, that is, the outcome of political elections. This contributes to a better understanding of the temporal duration of the effects of organizational change on job satisfaction in the workplace. Our results show that the effect of political change on the job satisfaction of public sector workers is relatively weak and short term. This implies that the outcome of political elections is not crucial for the operation of public administration. This is especially true when we consider the political context in the United Kingdom. The two major political parties, the Labor and Conservative parties, have evolved toward very similar economic and social policies. Thus, a change in political leadership from Conservative to Labour (as we observe in our quasi-natural experiment) is unlikely to result in the types of changes in policy desired by party supporters. This result indicates that the initial euphoria of having one\'s preferred political party assume leadership of the public sector is not sustained. More fundamental reforms may carry with them a longer lasting impact on satisfaction.

Second, our study further extends PO fit research by investigating the effect on job satisfaction of employee political preferences matching the political affiliation of the senior governing officials. Prior to this study, very few studies attempted to examine political preferences in relation to the work context ([@b5]). This is surprising given the variety of topics studied in the organization political behavior literature ([@b8]). Therefore, we extend the analysis of PO fit and job satisfaction to include political preferences. This is important because this literature has hypothesized that a better match between organizations and individuals can result in more efficient and effective organizational performance ([@b4]). However, while we find that political preferences can have a significant impact on job satisfaction in the public sector, this impact is weak and transitory. This implies that some forms of PO fit, such as the matching of political preferences, will have a smaller impact on organizational performance than expected.

Nonetheless, we find complete adaptation for men immediately after the event and adaptation for women after three years. This challenges PO fit theory because, according to PO fit theory, if values are aligned (i.e., matched preferences), job satisfaction should not decline. Thus, researchers may want to investigate the temporal aspects of PO fit theory to a stronger extent.

Third, we highlight how the effects of political preference matching differ across gender. Women seem to be less prone to political influence, even though they might still have strong political preferences. Their job satisfaction is less likely to be significantly influenced by political preferences. Men tend to display the opposite behavior. Their job satisfaction depends to a larger extent on their political preferences, in the short term at least. This finding confirms the previous argument that men and women organize their political views in different ways ([@b9]; [@b26]).

Managerial Implications
-----------------------

Our findings have several implications for public sector managers. First, our results show that a change in political leadership will only have a short-term impact on job satisfaction in the public sector. This suggests that public sector managers do not have to spend scare resources helping public sector employees become used to the new political direction in which the public sector will be led. Second, we also find that the change in public sector political leadership can adversely affect the job satisfaction of women. Public sector organizations should ensure they have policies and take action to mitigate the adverse effects of workplace reorganization on job satisfaction that follow a change in political leadership of the public sector. Such policies should be focused on reducing uncertainty, as previous research has shown that this is a major cause of the decline in job satisfaction before and during workplace reorganization.

Limitations and Future Research
-------------------------------

Finally, we have to address a number of limitations that affect the interpretation of our findings. At the same time, these limitations are a good trigger for future research. First, our analyses use U.K. data only. Thus, the findings mainly relate to a U.K. working environment, and we cannot claim that the results are universally applicable. However, previous research has shown that the factors influencing the relation between job satisfaction and context factors are very similar across countries ([@b37]). Thus, the results presented here are of relevance for an international audience as well. Consequently, an option for future research arises with respect to cross-country comparisons of matched or mismatched political preferences and their effects on job satisfaction. Such an endeavor would help validate the findings presented here at an international level.

Second, we acknowledge the possibility of selection effects for which we were not able to control. However, our main approach was to investigate the patterns of adaptation, which are unlikely to be affected by selection effects.

Third, we rely on self-reported measures of satisfaction and do not apply objective measures of performance, as in [@b33]. However, this limitation is compensated by the large sample that we use, in the sense that distortion of self-reported measures is unlikely to have a major influence. Nonetheless, it would be a worthwhile effort to extend the analyses presented here to more objective performance data.

Fourth, we only estimate how political party preferences affect the job satisfaction of supporters of the two major political parties in the United Kingdom. A sizable proportion of public sector employees in the United Kingdom support smaller parties, such as the Liberal Democrats (Liberals/SDP), Scottish Nationalists, Plaid Cymru, and Green Party. Our methodology does not allow us to investigate how political party preference matching affects these employees because none of these smaller political parties governed during our sample period.

Fifth, we consider the impact of a change in central government political leadership. While the senior governing officials of the central government are likely to affect the values, culture, and climate of the entire public sector through their policies and decisions, their impact is likely to vary depending on whether employees work for the central government, local government, or public sector organizations, such as the National Health Service. Our data and methodology do not allow us to investigate how political preference matching varies across these different levels of government because the sample sizes for preference matching become too small when divided into the different levels of government. It will be worthwhile for future research to extend our analysis to the different levels of government to investigate how the impact of political preferences on job satisfaction differs across the different levels of government.

Finally, BHPS data are collected annually. This limits our analysis to the year in which an event takes place instead of the actual date of the event. A recent study by [@b27] improves reliability of the findings by using quarterly rather than yearly data to test for anticipation, adaptation, and selection effects in the Australian labor market. Further research needs to be done on the causal connection between preference matching and job satisfaction and future research can improve reliability and accuracy by using higher frequency data to more accurately investigate the dynamic impact of externally driven organizational change on job satisfaction.

For a detailed description of the BHPS survey, including details about survey design, attrition, and sampling issues, see [@b46] and [@b58].

The 1997 general election took place in May. The BHPS data were collected between September and December, and so we consider 1997 as a year in which the Labour Party was in power.

Table A1 in the appendix presents the distribution of job satisfaction in the effective estimation sample.

Table A2 in the appendix presents a complete description of the control variables used in this study and their means.

See table A2 in the appendix for a description and summary statistics of these individual and labor market characteristics.

A1The Distribution of Job Satisfaction MeasuresRankMenWomenOverall Job SatisfactionOverall Job SatisfactionCount%Count%1 140 1.72 128 1.082 250 3.06 274 2.303 639 7.83 805 6.774 675 8.27 678 5.7051,89723.252,60021.8663,83647.015,91549.747 723 8.861,49312.55Total8,159100.0011,893100.00 A2Variable DefinitionsVariablesDefinitionMeanAgeAge of respondent40.12Age^2^Square of respondent\'s age divided by 1,000 1.73HealthEquals 1 if respondent reports no health problems 0.51Higher EducationEquals 1 if respondent\'s education includes a higher degree, a first degree, a teaching qualification, or some other higher qualification 0.64Medium EducationEquals 1 if respondent\'s education includes a nursing qualification, GCE A levels, or GCE O levels 0.27No. of ChildrenThe number of children each respondent has 0.56Lower EducationEquals 1 if respondent\'s education includes a commercial qualification (with no GCE O level), CSE Grade 2--5 or Scot G, apprenticeship, other qualifications, or no qualifications 0.09MarriedEquals one 1 if respondent is married 0.57CoupleEquals 1 if respondent is living with his or her partner 0.15WidowedEquals 1 if respondent is widowed 0.01DivorcedEquals 1 if respondent is divorced 0.07SeparatedEquals 1 if respondent is separated from spouse 0.02Never marriedEquals 1 if respondent has never been married 0.18RenterEquals 1 if respondent rents the property he/she resides in 0.15Log real wageLog of respondent\'s usual inflation adjusted monthly pay 2.78Log Work HoursLog of the respondent\'s weekly working hours 3.59Union MemberEquals 1 if respondent is a member of a labor union 0.64Promotion OpportunitiesEquals 1 if respondent believes his or her current employment offers promotion opportunities, 0 if he or she does not 0.58Job TenureLength of time served in current job (in years) 5.41Small Firm SizeEquals 1 if respondent works for a firm with 1--24 employees 0.20Medium Firm SizeEquals 1 if respondent works for a firm with 25--299 employees 0.39Large Firm SizeEquals 1 if respondent works for firm with 200 or more employees 0.41Occupational DummiesOccupation dummies at the one-digit levelIndustry DummiesIndustry dummies at the one-digit levelRegional dummiesEquals 1 if respondent lives in Inner London, Outer London, Rest of South East, South West, East Anglia, East Midlands, West Midlands Conurb, Rest of West Manchester, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Rest of North West, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Rest of Yorkshire and Humber, Tyne and Wear, Rest of North, Wales, Scotland, or Northern Ireland A3Number of Observations of Lags and LeadsTransition to Preference MatchingMenWomen*Leads*1--2 years hence139118Within the next year149148*Lags*0--1 years1361501--2 years1301252--3 years1171053--4 years101 934--5 years 99 865 or more years478442
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